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Tax revenue in Central American countries accounts for just 13.5%
of their gross domestic product; and the resultant resource shortage means
insufficient and low-quality public expenditure, and chronic fiscal deficits
financed through borrowing. In 2003 interest payments absorbed an
average of 18% of the subregion's total tax revenue. In these open
economies, whose enterprises need to become more internationally
competitive, fiscal policy is crucial both for financing the necessary physical
and social infrastructure and for combating the poverty that still afflicts
roughly 40% of the population. The economic development of Central
America therefore needs second-generation reforms to modernize its tax
systems, in order to increase revenue by about four percentage points of GDP.
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I
Encouraging tax reform in Central America
Tax reform is essential in Central America if the aim is
to achieve the faster growing and more equitable type
of society to which its peoples aspire. There are several
reasons for promoting tax reform: firstly, and most
importantly, the subregion's States are too small and
vulnerable to deliver the public goods needed to foster
economic growth and raise their populations' levels of
well-being. The fact that average tax revenue in the
subregion has hovered around 13.5% of GDP in recent
years readily explains why these countries are unable
improve their levels of education and health care, build
the infrastructure needed for development, and provide
the legal certainty and citizen safety demanded by
private investment.
Secondly, all Central American countries carry
heavy burdens of public debt accumulated during years
of chronic fiscal deficit. Their Governments therefore
need to raise tax revenues to generate primary surpluses
(fiscal balances before debt interest), in order to place
the public debt on a long-term sustainable footing.
 The third reason is that changes in the patterns of
the subregion's international participation will require
far-reaching reforms in its tax systems. When the free
trade agreement (FTA) between Central America and the
United States enters into force,1 their revenue from
import duties will drop sharply, and the loss will need
to be recovered through other taxation sources.
Moreover, the fact that all of the region's countries
have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) means
that they will have to abide by its decisions. The most
important of those decisions for Central American
countries requires the elimination, no later than early
2010, of income tax exemptions for free zone
enterprises. These are viewed as an export subsidy and
therefore prohibited by the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement) in the
Uruguay Round that was concluded in early 1995.
Application of that agreement will mean
reconciling the need to expand revenue but avoid
discouraging investment in the most dynamic sectors
of the economy, for which corporate income tax will
need to be set at moderate rates. To avoid the implicit
subsidy, the WTO requires tax rates inside and outside
free zones to be equal; but this could cause revenue
losses, if rates are lowered for firms located outside
free zones. It will therefore be crucial to close off other
avenues for avoiding corporate income taxes, such as
the numerous exemptions and accelerated depreciation
regimes. Rates can be moderate, but the tax bases need
to be as broad as possible.
 The fact that integration between the Central
American countries is being deepened will also have
significant effects on the design of tax reform. The
implications for tax systems are obvious: in the absence
of regionwide tax coordination it will be impossible to
avoid tax arbitrage, which will mean undesired
production and revenue losses for some countries and
gains for others. Income tax in free zones is an obvious
example. Without subregional harmonization, countries
will have much to lose: competition for investment will
force an unnecessary reduction in income tax on
enterprises generally, because the WTO norm is to move
towards equal tax treatment throughout the economy.
A fourth reason, which poses another challenge
for tax systems in Central American countries, is the
need to design a suitable strategy for tax
decentralization. All of these countries have made
decentralization a priority, but none has managed to
implement it without a loss of revenue for central
government, which undermines its performance. Local
taxes need to be strengthened, particularly property tax
which currently generates very modest revenue below
its potential.
1. Human development and the role of public
spending in the social sector
The central premise of this paper is that economic
growth and human development are intimately linked
through relations of multiple causation.2 Firstly, the
This article is based on the analyses and conclusions contained
in Recaudar para crecer. Bases para la reforma tributaria en
Centroamérica, edited by R. Agosin, A. Barreix and R. Machado,
and published by the Inter-American Development Bank.
1 Known by its English acronym CAFTA.
2 The term “human development” is used here with the meaning
popularized by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP). The components of this generic term are very broad and
81C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 7  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 5
TAX REFORM FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA  •  MANUEL R. AGOSIN,
ALBERTO BARREIX, JUAN CARLOS GÓMEZ SABAINI AND ROBERTO MACHADO
hypothesis that the key aspects of human development
depend on per capita income is generally accepted.
Secondly, the causation relation also runs from human
development to sustained growth. The latter requires a
labour force with a minimum level of education, without
which labour productivity is too low to make private
investment profitable. The same is true of health: a
population with poor health means a low-productivity
work force. Consequently, health and education, key
aspects of human development, are not only ends in
themselves, but also an essential input for growth.
Although Central American Governments have
introduced major economic reforms, their public social
spending is still too low.3 Tax revenue in the subregion
absorbs between 10% and 14% of GDP, with public
expenditure between 10% and 18%.4 These rates are
low compared with what would be expected in
economies with the structural characteristics of Central
American countries.
This statement is the result of an econometric
analysis of tax revenue, total public expenditure and
public expenditure on education and health care
throughout the world as a proportion of GDP, and the
relative ranking of the countries of the region. All
variables were measured in the late 1990s. The
differences between countries in terms of tax revenue
and public expenditure are explained by the variation
in GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parity)
and by the income distribution as measured by the Gini
coefficient. As per capita income rises, so does the tax
burden and public expenditure, because the higher a
country's income, the greater is its capacity to finance
public expenditure and basic social spending. It is also
reasonable to expect that the demand for public
expenditure by the population will vary in direct relation
to per capita income and inversely with income
inequality. The latter hypothesis assumes that the more
egalitarian is the distribution of income, the greater the
influence of the middle income segments in economic
and social policy decision making; and it is precisely
these latter groups that demand social public services.
The results, which support these hypotheses are shown
in the appendix.5
Interpolating the values of GDP per capita and the
Gini coefficient for the five countries of the Central
American Common Market (CACM) in the estimated
equations, shows that the expected values of the four
fiscal variables are higher than those observed in nearly
all cases. This shows that, even when controlling for
the structural characteristics of the Central American
economies, their States are small. Figure 1 illustrates
the results for tax revenue.
There is a large discrepancy between the expected
and actual tax burden in Costa Rica, where actual
revenue in the late 1990s was below the regional average
at just 12% of GDP (it is now slightly over 13%), in
circumstances where its per capita GDP is the highest in
the subregion, surpassing those of the two poorest
countries (Honduras and Nicaragua) by a factor of
between three and four (measured in purchasing power
parity dollars and adjusting for the underestimate of
GDP in those two countries). At the same time, the Gini
coefficient in Costa Rica is the region's lowest (0.48
compared to 0.63 Guatemala and 0.58 in Nicaragua).
This leads to the conclusion that, to achieve the
estimated norm in terms of income levels and their
distribution, tax revenue should rise by 35% or roughly
4 percentage points of GDP, which is the average gap
shown in figure 1.
encompass higher life expectancy, a life of good quality with low
indices of disease, good education indicators, citizen participation
in decision making, equal opportunities, and gender equality. In
the view propounded by Amartya Sen, human development is
synonymous with freedom: the capacity of individuals to live in
the way they choose (Sen, 1999). Naturally, GDP per capita is an
inevitable indicator of human development, but it is not the only
one. Evaluating a nation’s levels of human development requires
weighing up a broad set of variables, such as those summarized by
UNDP in its Human Development Index.
3 All countries of the subregion have substantially liberalized their
markets, privatized many public enterprises, and generally opened
their economies up to external trade. For a description of these
processes see Agosin, Machado and Nazal (2004).
4 Correcting for the underestimate of GDP in Nicaragua and Honduras
–a phenomenon that is well known by specialists in the subregion.
For a discussion of this underestimate in Honduras, see UNDP (2000,
chapter 3). Estimations made by one of the authors of this article,
based on an analysis of all existing data, show that GDP in Honduras
and Nicaragua would have to be corrected by at least 40% and
70%, in that order, to bring it close to its real level. After several
years of work, the Central Bank of Nicaragua raised its GDP estimate
by 63% in the national accounts revisions of 2003. The Central
Bank of Honduras has not yet published its revisions.
5 Note that this theoretical outline contradicts the influential model
developed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), which postulates that tax
revenue is greater the more unequal is the income distribution.
Those authors use a median-voter model, in which voters prefer
higher taxes the smaller are the stocks of physical and human capital
among the majority of the population (precisely when the income
distribution is most unequal). The statistical data do not support
this theory, however. On the contrary, they are consistent with our
theoretical approach.
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2. Public Finance: deficit, debt and sustainability
As table 1 shows, in 2004 the fiscal deficit of Central
American countries varied between 1.1% and 4.3% of
GDP. Although the average had fallen since 2000,
individual deficits were still high, especially considering
that 2004 was a year of relatively strong growth. The
figures show a persistence of deficits, with particularly
large imbalances in Honduras and Nicaragua.
This has several undesirable consequences. Firstly,
it makes it hard to achieve macroeconomic stability,
for although most countries no longer finance their
shortfalls by placing bonds with their central bank, the
deficit still stokes demand pressures that force central
banks to maintain austere monetary policies. This raises
interest rates for the private sector and sucks in short-
term foreign capital, thereby causing local currencies
to appreciate. Secondly, to avoid the public debt
becoming unsustainable, countries are constantly under
pressure to curtail expenditure (generally on social
investment or physical infrastructure), or to raise rates
on the taxes that are relatively easy to collect. Lastly,
the persistence of deficits prevents the economic
authorities from deploying countercyclical fiscal policy.
Persistent fiscal deficits clearly render the public debt
unsustainable in all countries in the region, so they need
to be corrected, either by increasing the tax burden or
by curtailing expenditure.6
3. Tax implications of the free trade agreement
between Central America and the United States
Between late 2003 and early 2004, CACM members
completed negotiation of the CAFTA agreement, which,
once ratified, will have major repercussions for the
TABLE 1
Central America: central government




1995 2000 2004 2004b 2004b
Costa Rica 4.0 2.9 3.0 21.1 38.7
El Salvador 0.6 2.3 2.8 31.4 13.4
Guatemala 0.7 1.8 1.1 16.0 9.4
Honduras 3.1 5.7 3.5 61.6 7.5
Nicaraguac 11.0 11.0 4.3 76.0d 41.3
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005).
a For Honduras and Nicaragua the GDP figures shown are the official
ones, which overstate the levels of the deficit and public debt.
b Year-end figures.
c Fiscal deficit before grants.
d After debt relief arising from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative.
6 For an analysis of the sustainability of public debt in Central
America see Edwards and Vergara (2002) and Vergara (2003).
FIGURE 1
Central American countries: expected and observed tax revenue, late 1990s
(Percentage of GDP)
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Central American economies.7 Its effects will also be
felt on those countries' tax policies, given the volume
of their purchases from the United States, which in 2004
accounted for one third of total imports in Central
American countries (excluding maquila inputs which
enter duty-free). The revenue obtained from import
duties amounted to between 0.9% and 2% of GDP in
that year.
Based on the tariff elimination timetables offered
by the countries in the framework of CAFTA, and on
imports from the United States and current tariff rates,
Barreix, Roca and Villela (2004) calculated the short-
run revenue losses associated with the agreement as
likely to represent on average 0.4% of GDP. In the
medium-term, as imports from the United States
become more fully exempted from tariffs, the revenue
loss would rise to 0.7% of GDP. Losses would be smaller
in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua (0.4% of GDP),
but larger in Honduras (1.1% of GDP), while in Costa
Rica the loss is expected to be at an intermediate level
(0.6% of GDP).8 Tax reform will therefore also have to
compensate for the revenue losses arising from with
CAFTA.
4. Challenges of the new international
participation
Application of the "open regionalism" model adopted
by the countries of the region in the late 1980s is likely
to intensify in the next few years, and this will pose
major challenges for tax policy. Once such challenge
is the increasing need for CACM member countries to
standardize their tax systems, as the economic and
financial relations between them grow, and given the
WTO requirement that the countries of the region
dismantle income tax exemptions for enterprises
operating in free zones.
a)  Tax harmonization in CACM
The intensification of regional integration includes
an effort to standardize taxation policies, which has not
yet happened at the Central American level. For
example, to remove customs barriers within the
subregion and facilitate the movement of merchandise
within it, it is essential to harmonize the criteria used
to assess value-added tax (VAT) and selective
consumption taxes. It is also important to agree upon
joint administrative regulations to replace the controls
formerly applied by customs, to avoid tax fraud.
Although VAT rates have been converging, the same
cannot be said for selective consumption taxes.
The need for coordination is even greater in the
case of corporate income tax, to avoid losses of tax
revenue in jurisdictions that have the highest rates. In
an increasingly integrated subregion, conglomerate
groups with branches in various countries will tend to
declare their profits in the countries that have the lowest
rates. The simplest solution is therefore to ensure that
rates do not diverge much between countries.9 The most
complex solution involves adopting a system of transfer
prices (and weak capitalization rules) to prevent firms
from withdrawing profits from one country through
transactions or concerted loans between subsidiaries,
especially when the participants in this process include
firms located in tax havens. The Central American
countries also need to consider signing double taxation
agreements with the home countries of foreign
enterprises, to strengthen legal certainty for investors
based on common foundations, in order to improve their
negotiating capacity and avoid harmful competition and
misuse of incentives.
b) Export promotion model and WTO rules
Tax reform in the countries of the subregion is also
motivated by the need to rethink the strategy pursued
by Central American countries in the 1990s both for
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and for export
promotion. This was based largely on granting tax
breaks to firms established in free zones, mainly through
income-tax exemptions.
At the present time, increasing international trade
commitments require homogeneous tax treatment for
national enterprises and those established in free zones,
and, especially, coordinated treatment of income tax
on such firms between the different Central American
countries. This would avoid provoking predatory
competition between the countries to attract FDI, which
would have serious consequences for the revenue
capacity and equity of their tax structures.
7 See Agosin and Rodríguez (2005), Todd, Winters and Arias (2004),
and Hathaway (2003).
8 These calculations only include the direct effects of gradually
dismantling tariffs. There are other effects that would tend to
aggravate the adverse revenue consequences, such as increased
imports from the United States to the detriment of those sourced
from third countries. But there could be positive effects also: for
example, CAFTA is bound to attract investments that will in turn
generate taxable production and consumption.
9 As will be shown below, although income tax rates have been
converging, substantial differences persist.
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The Final Act of the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations, which concluded in 1995, contains
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SMC Agreement) mentioned above, which
was to have become binding on developing countries
as from 2003, except for those with an annual per capita
income below US$ 1,000 (Honduras and Nicaragua in
the Central American subregion). The agreement
expressly prohibits corporate income tax exemptions
for exporting firms. Nonetheless, under Article 27, the
deadline was extended for a further five years at the
Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha in
November 2001; and while this article was being
written, the final deadline was once again postponed
until 1 January 2010. Following the national accounts
revisions in Honduras (as yet incomplete) and
Nicaragua, these two countries should now be near the
threshold of US$ 1,000 per capita, and will certainly
surpass it in early 2010, so the SMC Agreement
regulations will then also apply to them.
II
Tax panorama in Central American countries
Between 1990 and 2003 the average revenue level rose
by roughly 40%. Moreover, several countries
introduced modern taxes, such as VAT, into their fiscal
structures and sharply lowered customs duties. At the
same time, major efforts have been made to improve
tax administrations.
Nonetheless, the tax burden remains insufficient
and is keeping these countries below their revenue-
generating capacity. Their tax systems tend also to be
regressive, because of weak income tax; and, as they
are highly centralized, property taxes are insignificant.
Following the 1990s reforms, which could be dubbed
"first-generation", the region now needs new reform
commitments to modernize their tax systems and equip
them to meet the challenges described in the first part
of this article.
1. Current tax policy situation
a) Trend of total tax revenue
As table 2 shows, the average tax burden has
followed a highly variable rising trend. This is
essentially due to the constraints imposed on tax bases
by the large number of exemptions and reductions, and
the levels of non-fulfillment and evasion that exist in
Central America, which have made it necessary to
introduce periodic tax reforms to restore levels of tax
pressure.
Despite the trend of the average level of taxation
in the subregion, several countries still have very low
tax burdens. In addition, the continuous liberalization
of foreign trade in these countries has placed a heavy
burden on their tax administrations, which have had to
struggle to regain revenues that were previously
obtained more easily through customs, while also being
required to operate a more complex system and oversee
a larger number of domestic taxpayers.
As mentioned above, the Central American
countries have attempted to overcome the loss of tax
revenue caused by external trade liberalization through
successive hikes in VAT. Several countries have tried to
counter what they see as a regressive effect of this tax,
by granting substantial exemptions and inappropriately
charging a zero rate of VAT on goods included in the
basic shopping basket. Zero-rating entitles the
producers of a good subject to that rate to recover the
TABLE 2
Central American countries: tax burden,
1990-2003a
(Percentage of GDP)
1990 1995 2000 2003
Costa Rica 10.8 11.4 11.9 13.0
El Salvador 7.6 11.9 11.0 12.6
Guatemala 6.9 8.0 9.5 10.3
Honduras 15.0 17.3 16.6 15.9
Nicaragua 8.1 12.2 14.5 15.8
Central America
(simple average) 9.7 12.2 12.7 13.5
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005).
a The data do not include income from social security. The GDP of
Honduras has not been corrected for the underestimation, because
there are no official data that do so. The figure for Nicaragua
uses the new GDP estimates made by the Central Bank of Nicaragua
in 2003. All tables hereinafter use the official figures published
by the respective countries.
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credits generated by VAT paid on inputs, which gives
rise to abuses and undermines the productivity of the
tax, thereby reducing the tax burden.
b) Trend of the tax structure
Between 1990 and 2002, there were clearly defined
patterns in the subregion's tax structures. First, as noted
above, import duties were replaced by VAT. The second
important change involved lowering the legal top rates
of income tax for both individuals and firms, from above
40% to below 30%.
Third, the relative share of direct taxes remained
constant throughout the period: while direct taxes
generated on average 24% of total tax revenues in the
13 countries considered, indirect taxes provided the
remaining 76%. Nonetheless, over the last five years,
the share of revenue obtained from direct taxes has been
creeping up, despite the lowering of rates, as new
taxpayers have been added to the income-tax base and
the importance of certain indirect taxes (selective taxes
and foreign trade duties) has declined.
Fourth, during this period over 50% of all VAT
revenue was collected through customs (when goods
were imported). The volume of tax revenue obtained
through customs has helped reduce the average rate of
tax evasion, since the tax administration is concerned
only with taxes generated from domestic sources.
Last, selective taxes, although erratic from one year
to the next, contributed roughly 15% of total revenue.
The share of revenue raised by selective taxes on fuels
displayed a clear rising trend, while the number of goods
subject to this type of tax (mainly products such as
tobacco and drinks) declined.
In short, and because of these changes, it was
indirect taxes that played the largest role in the trend of
the tax burden over the last decade. The share of total
revenue collected from direct taxes, in the form of
income or capital taxes, did not change significantly
during the period.
As can be seen in table 3, which shows the structure
of revenue in 2002, indirect taxes continue to generate
the bulk of the revenue. This probably indicates that
the reforms ought to focus on direct taxation, which
only raise roughly 3% of GDP.
c) Incentives for foreign investment and preferential
treatment
The transition from development based on import
substitution to an open-economy model was
accompanied by a series of incentive measures –many
of them with high tax content– which also had
repercussions on revenue earned from other taxes. The
export expansion was heavily concentrated in firms
(both foreign and domestic) located in free zones,
essentially assembling manufactured goods using inputs
imported from the United States (“maquila”). There
were also significant investments in tourism, fishing
(especially shrimp farming) and mining. To stimulate
these capital inflows, generous and broad-based
exemptions were granted that wholly or partly freed
TABLE 3
Central American countries: tax burden by type of tax, 2002
(Percentage of GDP)
Item Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Total tax revenues 12.8 12.0 10.6 16.1 14.3
Direct tax revenues 3.5 3.5 2.8 3.7 2.8
Income tax 3.1 3.4 2.8 3.5 2.8
Property tax 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
Indirect tax revenues 9.3 8.5 7.8 12.3 11.4
General 4.9 6.3 4.8 5.5 5.9
Domestic .. 3.0 1.9 .. ..
Imports .. 3.3 2.9 .. ..
Specific 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.9 3.7
Petroleum products .. 0.6 0.9 0.7 2.5
Remainder .. 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.3
Trade and international transactions 0.9 1.1 1.2 2.0 1.1
Other indirect 2.4 0.0 0.3 2.9 0.7
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005).
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the investment from the payment of income and capital
taxes. Moreover, the treatment given to foreign investors
was also extended to domestic firms established in free
zones, and even to their suppliers in those zones.
Analysts disagree on the importance of these
exemptions –which, incidentally, have become quasi-
permanent– in attracting investments to sectors which,
in the final analysis, have significant comparative
advantages in the subregion. What is indisputable is
that such measures undermined the capacity of
Governments to generate tax revenues. As the activities
in question have been among the most dynamic of the
Central American economies, the low elasticity of
revenue with respect to GDP growth should be attributed
largely to the exemptions they have enjoyed.
It is hard to justify tax exemptions for domestic
firms operating in free zones. For foreign investors, the
benefits of income tax exemptions depend on their
dividend policy and legislation in their country of
origin. In the case of United States enterprises, which
account for the vast majority of foreign firms operating
in Central American countries, the situation is as
follows: if they repatriate dividends immediately after
recording the profits, any rate of corporate income tax
rate below that prevailing in their home country (35%)
merely transfers revenue to the United States Treasury
from the country receiving the investment, with no
effect on the firms themselves.
If the firms do not immediately pass the dividends
to their parent company, they do not have to pay tax on
the corresponding profits in the United States until they
are actually repatriated, which gives them a degree of
liquidity they would not otherwise have enjoyed.
Accordingly, the firms are likely to overstate the value
of those exemptions, and the clear result of the process
is a loss of revenue for Central American Treasuries.
Another recurrent issue in the countries of the
subregion over the last decade has been the proliferation
and diversity of incentive regimes, both in domestic
activities and in those directly related to foreign trade.
The promotion of activities relating to tourism,
construction, agriculture and mining, among others, and
the proliferation of free and tax-free zones are constants
that are repeated in each individual country. Exemptions
have been granted not only for corporate income tax but
also for import duties on inputs and capital goods and
for domestic indirect taxes. Table 4 shows the tax benefits
granted in free zones by Central American countries.
TABLE 4
Central American countries: tax incentives in free zones, 2002
(Percentages)
Incentives Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
Exemption from
import duty 100 100 100 100 100
Exemption from 100% for eight years; 100% for 100% for 100 100% for 10 years
income tax  50% for the following 20 years 12 years 60% thereafter
four yearsa
Exemption on the 100 100 100 100 100
repatriation of profits
Exemption from VAT 100 100% for 10 years 100 100 100
 and renewable
Exemption from 100% for 10 years 100 100 100 100
asset taxes
Exemption from 100% for 10 years 100% for 20 years 100 100 100
municipal taxes
and rates
Restrictions Up to 25% in None Up to 20% for With approval from With approval from
on/to local sales  manufacturing manufactures the Ministry of the Ministry of
50% in services Economic Affairs Economic Affairs
up to 5% in between 20% and
manufacturing 40% depending on
up to 50% in services the type of firm
Source: Rodríguez and Robles (2003).
a The deadlines are extended to twelve and six years in less developed zones.
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Lack of information on the identity of the
beneficiaries of these exemptions and incentives, and
in terms of their order of magnitude, has made it
impossible to estimate the total tax revenue that these
countries have forgone as a result. The benefits, which
are technically known as “tax expenses” and represent
the set of taxes and levies that are not generated because
they relate to promoted activities, impose an additional
cost on the tax administration because the latter has to
identify, within the universe of potential taxpayers, who
is and who is not benefiting from one of the incentive
regimes. Naturally, the exemptions have had to be offset
by a heavier tax burden on sectors that are not promoted,
which alters the conditions of horizontal equity by
imposing unequal tax burdens on economic agents
facing otherwise equal conditions.
The scope that these benefits have acquired since
the 1990s, and the absence of detailed data on the
various systems, makes it very hard to compare the
countries of the subregion in terms of the sectors
benefited, the type and extent of the benefits, and the
results obtained in each case.
2. Main characteristics of existing taxes
a)  Income tax
Despite the progress made in modernizing other
taxes, income tax (IR) in Central American countries
continues to suffer from a number of problems. Generally
speaking, personal income tax (IRP) is assessed on a
schedule basis rather than globally, which means that
each type of income is subject to a specific tax regime
with different rates. There are also many exemptions
according to the generating source (insurance, interest,
dividends and other financial and capital income). This
means that nearly all of the tax burden falls, in practice,
on the wages of employed workers, thereby distorting
both horizontal and vertical equity, and eroding revenue
effectiveness. As this situation is aggravated by the high
proportions of informal and self-employed workers in
Central American countries, it easy to see why the
revenue generated by this tax is so low.
Furthermore, IRP is based on a territorial concept
of income, so income generated abroad is not taxed.
While it is hard to identify such income, adoption of
the global income principle would be one way to close
off potentially significant opportunities for evasion, and
make it possible to provide the tax authority with
additional inspection tools.
As mentioned above, corporate income tax (IRS)
also offers a set of discretionary exemptions, basically
for foreign firms established in free zones and for
protected and/or promoted sectors, such as agriculture
and tourism. With regard to modernization of the design
of this tax, the legislation of Central American countries
has generally not introduced regulations on transfer
prices, weak capitalization, transfer of profits from and
to tax havens, and other mechanisms that are widely
used by transnational corporations to reduce their tax
burden by shifting profits from one country to another.
Table 5 shows that IR revenue in Central American
countries in 2002 amounted to 3.1% of GDP (24.2% of
TABLE 5
Central American countries: income taxa 2002
IRS rates IRP rates Revenue Productivity Minimum Maximum Share of IR Revenue
(%) (%) from IRS  of IRSb   exempt IRP in total tax from IR
(% of IR ( %) from IRPb bracketc revenue (% GDP)
 revenue) ( %) (%)
Costa Rica 30 10-25 20.8 3.5 0.8 3.7 23.9 3.1
El Salvador 25 10-30 61.7 7.8 1.2 11.0 28.3 3.4
Guatemalad 31 15-31 55.0 3.7 5.0 22.5 26.4 2.8
Honduras 15 and 25 10-25 18.2 8.6 3.6 36.0 22.0 3.5
Nicaraguae 25 10-25 .. .. 4.7 37.5 19.8 2.8
Average 27.2 11-27.2 38.9 6.7 3.1 22.1 24.2 3.1
Latin Americaf 28.3 8.7-27.7 50.0 6.2 2.1 20.7 27.7 3.8
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005); Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2002); Barreix, Roca and Villela (2004).
a IR: Income tax; IRS: Corporate income tax; IRP: Personal income tax.
b IRS revenue as a percentage of GDP, divided by the top IRS rate.
c Multiples of GDP per capita.
d Includes the mercantile and agricultural enterprises tax (IEMA).
e In May 2003 the top rate was raised to 30% for individuals and legal entities alike.
f Includes 17 countries. The figures correspond to the average for 2000-2001.
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total revenue), 0.7 percentage points below the average
for Latin America as a whole. The origin of these
revenues varies greatly from one country to another: on
average, 38.9% comes from enterprises - 11 percentage
points less than the figure for Latin America as a whole.
Legal entities contribute a high percentage of IR (61.7%)
in El Salvador, but just 18.2% in Honduras.
Although IRS rates have generally been lowered in
recent decades, what has eroded tax productivity in
Central American countries has been the shrinking of
the tax base. Average productivity has been 6.7%, which
means that each percentage point of the IRS rate collects
0.067 percentage points of GDP. Surprisingly, the lowest
productivity of this tax is seen in Costa Rica (3.5%),
while Honduras records the highest (8.6%), although
the latter is probably an overestimate, given the
significant underestimation of that country's GDP.
In the case of IRP, as normal, Central American
countries have a minimum tax-free bracket, which in this
case is equivalent to 3.1 times per capita GDP. Guatemala
and Nicaragua offer the highest levels of exemption at
more than twice the Latin American average. Although
such exemptions introduce a degree of progressiveness
into the tax structure, they can be counter-productive if
set at very high levels, and they also erode the tax base.
The top IRP bracket is 22.1 times per capita GDP in
Central American countries, a figure that is slightly above
the Latin American average. Nonetheless, the figure
would appear to be very high in Honduras and Nicaragua,
at 36 and 37.5 times per capita GDP respectively. Here again,
in the case of Honduras however, there is probably a clear
upwards bias because of the underestimate of GDP.
In short, despite the rationalization of IRP and IRS
rates, net taxable income declared is significantly less
than gross income in all countries. This reflects the
extent of the shrinking of the tax base, which mainly
stems from excessive objective and discretionary
exemptions which, apart from distorting the horizontal
and vertical equity of the tax system, generate
significant revenue losses.
b) Taxation of assets
In some countries a minimum tax is levied on the
income of legal entities, imputing a minimum return
on enterprise assets and levying the tax on the fiscal
value thereof or, in some cases, on sales. In countries
where accounting rules are unclear or easily interpreted
in favour of the firms' interests, this tax is harder to
avoid than the tax on net profits. The tax on assets
represents a minimum downpayment for IRS, and
operates through withholding which is then deducted
from the firm's profits tax liability. In cases where the
firm declares lower taxes than already paid on account,
the assets tax becomes a definitive payment.
As table 6 shows, most countries either have used,
or still use this type of tax. Following their initial
implementation, such taxes became less and less
effective because of the increase in the minimum
amount of capital required to apply them, and a steady
reduction in rates. In some cases they were abolished
in the face of the fierce opposition faced in all countries.
Nonetheless, when rates are moderate (with a maximum
of 1.5%) such taxes are desirable, because they help
improve the IRS capture level, given the absence of
trustworthy accounts and the shortcomings in tax
administrations. It should also be recognized that design
flaws have created problems of double taxation for the
subsidiaries of transnational enterprises, because some
developed countries do not grant tax credits for
downpayments on this tax.
TABLE 6
Central American countries: taxes on net worth or assets, 1992-2001
(Percentages)
Year Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
1992 0.36-1.17 0.9-2.0 0.3-0.9 ... 1.5-2.5
on fixed assets on assets on real propertya on net worth
2001 1.0 on assets .. 0.2-0.9 on real 0.25 on assetsb 1.0 on real
propertya propertya
3.5 on assetsc
Source: Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2002).
a Although the base consists of immovable assets, the tax is seen as an additional tax on enterprises.
b Levied on fixed assets worth over 750,000 lempiras owned by companies at the end of the tax period.
c Tax levied at a rate of 3.5% of assets or 2.25% of gross income declared in the sworn tax declaration relating to the previous year's profits.
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c) Value added tax (VAT)
Although VAT was introduced in most Central
American countries during the 1970s and 1980s, its
revenue share has grown vertiginously since the early
1990s, basically as a result of rate hikes and, to a lesser
extent, its extension to services. General VAT rates in
the various countries rose by between three and nine
percentage points between introduction of the tax and
2002; and as a result the average general rate in the
region climbed from 7% to 13%.
The design of VAT in Central American countries
suffers from two fundamental problems that erode the
tax base, introduce distortions into the economy,
undermine equity and make it hard to administer: these
are excessive exemptions and use of the zero rate.
The goods and services most frequently exempted
from VAT in Central American countries are products
included in the basic shopping basket, along with
transport, medical and education services, financial and
insurance transactions, and energy and fuels. As in the
case of income tax, in addition to these objective
exemptions there are also discretionary exemptions
for various categories of taxpayer such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) municipalities,
non-profit institutions - and for the agriculture sector
and enterprises established in free zones.
These distortions are aggravated by zero rating for
goods destined for the domestic market. Although this
practice is appropriate in the case of exports to avoid
undermining local producer competitiveness, in the case
of goods for domestic consumption it not only erodes
the tax base but also opens up a significant avenue of
evasion (and even corruption).
VAT has become the main source of revenue in
Central American countries; in 2002, it accounted for
43% of total tax revenue and represented between 4.8
and 6.3% of GDP. Nonetheless, the average revenue
obtained from it (5.3% of GDP) is 0.8 GDP percentage
points below the Latin American average.
The low productivity of this tax, at just 40.8%,
reflects the high levels of evasion, compounded by
excessive exemptions and zero rating. The countries
where VAT productivity is lowest are Costa Rica and
Nicaragua (37.7% and 39.3%, respectively), which is
explained by the multiple leakages of the tax in these
two countries. Furthermore, in Costa Rica VAT is not
levied on services at all. In contrast, El Salvador and
Honduras display productivity levels above 45%,
although in the latter case the calculations are biased
upwards by the aforementioned underestimate of GDP.
The economic literature suggests that the optimal
design for VAT involves a single rate levied on the widest
possible base.10 This approach prioritizes neutrality
between sectors and administrative simplicity, thereby
reducing opportunities for evasion. Moreover, the
generalization of VAT keeps domestic production on
equal footing with imports. Indeed, in an integrated
market with a zero tariff, as CAFTA is expected to be,
intrasectoral trade harms domestic producers that are
excluded from VAT. This is because the imported good
enters the country with no VAT burden, since this will
have been reimbursed by the Treasury of the good's
country of origin, whereas the domestic producer
TABLE 7
Central American countries: value added tax, 2002
(Percentage)
General Special Productivitya Share of VAT in VAT revenue
rate rate total tax revenue (% GDP)
Costa Rica 13.0 37.7 38.3 4.9
El Salvador 13.0 48.5 52.5 6.3
Guatemala 12.0 40.0 45.3 4.8
Honduras 12.0 15 45.8 34.3 5.5
Nicaragua 15.0 5 and 6 39.3 41.2 5.9
Average 13.0 40.8 43.0 5.3
Latin Americab 14.5 42.1 44.2 6.1
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005); Barreix, Roca and Villela (2004).
a VAT revenue as a percentage of GDP divided by the general rate.
b Includes 17 countries. The figures correspond to the average for 2000-2001.
10  See, for example, Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz (1999).
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cannot deduct VAT from inputs purchased because the
final product is excluded. The damage will be greater,
the less vertically integrated is the production process
for the good or service in question. If practically all
goods and services are taxed, the domestic producer
will be able to deduct VAT from inputs, and the importer
will pay VAT at the same rate, putting them on equal
competitive footing (Arias, Barreix and others, 2005).
Nonetheless, it is widely recognized that, in
economies where all goods are subject to VAT, the tax
has a regressive effect on the income distribution.
Although some recent studies have called this
hypothesis into question,11 what cannot be disputed is
that VAT exemptions or zero rating for goods that make
up a large share of the family shopping basket among
the poorest families (i.e. food) is not an effective way
to improve equity. As it is the better off who consume
most of the favoured goods, exemptions and zero rating
strongly erode the tax base and reduce the Government's
capacity to implement redistributive policies through
expenditure. It is more effective to obtain revenue
through a uniform VAT and then subsidize consumption
by the poor.
In short, while recent years have seen both an
increase in the share of revenue obtained from VAT and
a convergence in general rates towards increasingly
appropriate and similar levels (thereby facilitating the
trade integration process), serious problems persist
relating to excessive exemptions and zero rating for
non-exporters, which significantly erodes the tax base
and undermines its productivity. Zero rating for non-
exporters is also a formidable mechanism of evasion
and generates substantial administrative costs.
d) Selective consumption taxes (ISCs)
In recent years Central American countries have
made significant progress in three aspects: ISC levels,
the reduction in the number of goods and services taxed,
and greater use of ad valorem rather than specific taxes.
As table 8 shows, ISCs represented 1.5% of GDP in 2002
(12.2% of total revenue), 0.6 percentage points below
the average for all Latin American countries. Nicaragua
is where these taxes collected most revenue, at 3.7% of
GDP (equivalent to 26.8% of total tax revenue).
Elsewhere, ISCs collect between 1% and 2% of GDP
(varying between 8% and 14% of total tax revenue).
In some cases it might be worth raising very low
rates, for example in the case of cigarettes and
carbonated beverages in Honduras. In El Salvador,
systematically low rates explain the low level of revenue
obtained from ISCs.12 In Guatemala, meanwhile, ISC is
charged at specific rates, which reduces the elasticity
of the tax structure by failing to take account of
variations in the price of the goods and services taxed.
In view of the low price-elasticity of demand for these
goods, a rates hike would not significantly reduce the
quantities traded and would therefore expand tax
revenue.
e) Taxes on foreign trade
Following trade liberalization in the 1990s, the
average tariff in Central America in 2002 was just 5.6%,
slightly over half of the average for Latin America as a
whole (table 9).13 There are also many discretionary
exemptions and goods that are tariff-free, a phenomenon
mainly associated with promotion regimes, including
those relating to free zones. This generates a number of
problems, such as erosion of the tax base, and provides
incentives for evasion.
The strengthening of subregional integration and
trade treaties with third countries suggests that the trend
towards tariff elimination will continue, which in the
future will make tax revenue almost exclusively
dependent on domestic taxes. Tax administration will
therefore become more difficult, and improvements in
the tax collecting agencies will be necessary.
3. Distributive effects of tax systems
The distributive impact of taxes can only be determined
via an analysis of incidence based on a large volume of
data broken down by income deciles or quintiles
(distribution of incomes and consumption, income
sources, definition of the family unit, etc.) and on the
elasticities of the supply and demand for consumer
goods and factors of production. Such data are not
always available.
11  See Houghton (2004) and Jenkins and Kuo (2004). The argument
is that, in less developed countries, the informal sector is very
widespread and products traded on the informal market are not
covered by VAT. At the same time, the poorest segments of the
population make a high proportion of their purchases in that market
(or else produce for self-consumption), whereas the better off buy
their goods in formal establishments which do pay VAT. Thus, while
all consumption by the higher-income sectors is subject to VAT, a
large part of the consumption of lower-income sectors is not.
12  In the early 2005, the rates of ISCs on cigarettes and alcoholic
beverages were raised sharply.
13 The existence of CACM makes the average tariff between countries
minimal.
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Moreover, a number of assumptions have to be made,
for example relating to tax shifting; for example, it is
generally assumed that the direct impact and incidence
(the ultimate effect) of direct taxes on individuals fall on
the taxpayer himself. The same cannot be said of indirect
taxes, where tax shifting is the rule.14
Table 10 summarizes results obtained in national
studies performed for three countries in the subregion.
In percentage terms, the Gini coefficient after-tax is
higher than before tax in the three countries for which
information is available, which suggests that tax systems
actually increase income concentration. In the case of
14 The extent of shifting depends on the price elasticities of demand
and supply.
TABLE 8
Central American countries: selective consumption taxes, 2002
(Percentages)
ISC tax ratesa
Cigarettes Beers Rum Carbonated Higher octane Share in total Revenue
beverages gasoline tax revenue (% GDP)
Costa Rica 70.0 45.0 60.0 30.0 Specific 8.4 1.1
El Salvador 39.0 20.0b 20.0a 10.0 Specific 9.2 1.1
Guatemala 100.0 Specific Specific Specific Specific 14.2 1.5
Honduras 32.0 33.0 158.0c 8.0 Specific 11.8 1.9
Nicaragua 40.0 37.0 37.0d 14.5 Specific 26.8 3.7
Central America 12.2 1.5
Latin Americae 15.4 2.1
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005); Barreix, Roca and Villela (2004).
a Given the frequent changes in the rates of selective consumption taxes, the levels shown in the table may differ from those currently in
force.
b To the 20% ad valorem 0.0057 dollars should be added for each 1% of alcohol volume per litre.
c For the remainder of alcoholic beverages, the figure is 445 plus an additional 20%.
d For the remainder alcoholic beverages, the figure is 37%.
e Includes 17 countries. The figures correspond to the average for 2000-2001.
TABLE 9
Central American countries: taxes on foreign trade, 2002
(Percentage)
Average ad valorem Standard Share of these taxes Revenue from these
tariff deviation in total tax revenue taxes % GDP
Costa Rica 6.0  ... 7.3 0.9
El Salvador 5.6 8.6 9.2 1.1
Guatemala 5.9 8.0 11.3 1.2
Honduras 5.3 ... 12.5 2.0
Nicaragua 5.2 5.8 7.9 1.1
Average 5.6 7.5 9.5 1.2
Latin Americaa 10.1 6.9 8.9 1.2
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005); Barreix, Roca and Villela (2004).
a Includes 17 countries. Figures correspond to the average for 2000-2001.
TABLE 10
Central America (three countries):
Gini coefficients of income distributiona
before and after taxes, 2000
Country Coverage Gini coefficient Gini coefficient
before taxes after taxes
Costa Rica National taxes 0.482 0.483
El Salvador National taxes 0.502 0.517
Honduras National and 0.543 0.571
municipal taxes
Source: Agosin, Barreix and Machado (2005); Bolaños (2002).
a The calculations of Gini coefficients are based on household deciles.
Costa Rica, the effect of the tax system on the income
distribution in 2000 is marginal.
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III
Recommendations on tax reform
Having identified the reasons for tax reform and
described the Central American tax systems in the
previous sections, it is now possible to identify the
elements that need to be included in the future tax reforms
to be undertaken by the countries of the subregion.
1. The key objective: to increase revenue
to invest in people
All the recommendations made in this paper aim at
increasing the tax burden to provide the region's
Governments with additional resources to invest in
human development. This is consistent with the long-
term aim of all Central American countries: to speed
up growth and at the same time improve the income
distribution.
Increasing tax pressure requires expanding tax
bases and strengthening the tax administration, rather
than raising rates. Such measures will also make it
possible to improve the elasticity of the tax system with
respect to changes in income.
Modernizing tax systems requires striking an
appropriate balance between direct and indirect
taxation, making it possible to form a tax system based
on a few taxes that have broad and general tax bases
with moderate rates. Major efforts are needed to expand
not only the VAT tax base but also the personal and
corporate income tax bases, while eliminating
exemptions and benefits that result in unequal treatment
for different taxpayers.
Many of the changes that could be introduced, and
which have been referred to as second-generation
reforms in view of the difficulties involved in
implementing them, form part of a process whose
results will only be seen in time. For that reason, the
reform programme needs to strike a balance between
immediate resource needs and medium- and long-term
structural reforms.
It is essential to start quantifying the loss that each
incentive regime inflicts on the Treasury and hence the
opportunity cost it involves. This means undertaking
studies of tax expense for all countries in the subregion.
In addition, detailed knowledge of that data will make
it possible to identify the beneficiaries of tax expenses,
the sectors promoted and the goods and services
affected, and thus go beyond mere analysis of the fiscal
cost of incentive measures to more fully understand
their economic effects.
2. The need for subregional coordination
There is an urgent need to define a set of parameters or
basic criteria within which each Central American
country would be free to choose, according to their
particular circumstances. One of the initial aims should
be to avert fiscal wars within the subregion, since these
inevitably result in the degradation of tax systems.
Regional coordination should include both the
establishment of reference guidelines on tax incentives
and the limits on the selective taxation of certain goods,
together with criteria for determining the tax bases of
VAT and income tax. In the latter case, it would be very
useful for the subregion as a whole (possibly in the
context of CAFTA) to negotiate a tax agreement with the
United States and adopt regulations on transfer prices.15
3. Alternatives for reform of income
and wealth taxes
The analysis of individual and corporate income taxes
should be included in the debate on reform alternatives.
As mentioned above, the highly concentrated
distribution of personal or family income in the
subregion is aggravated by existing tax systems. While
tax policy is not the most suitable instrument for
modifying the pre-tax income distribution, it is hard to
accept the regressive the impact of the taxes.
It is also worth mentioning that efficiently
administering and inspecting taxes on income and
wealth is more complicated than in the case of indirect
taxes. Additional efforts are therefore needed, combined
with progress in generalizing at-source withholding
systems as a way of complementing government action.
In the case of corporate income tax, the analysis
of the situation in Central American countries shows
that the revenue potential of that tax has not been fully
exploited because of shortcomings in the capacity of
the tax base to capture the changes that have occurred
in their economies. Although substantial improvements
15 The rules of the Internal Revenue Service of the United States
provide a model that could be emulated.
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have been made to the tax structure in recent years,
with inappropriate progressive taxes on business profits
being turned into proportional taxes, tax bases still need
to be modernized and generalized. The reform proposal
prepared in Costa Rica in late 2001 is aimed in that
direction, although its parliamentary approval is not
without difficulty.
It would be helpful to resume the charging of
minimum taxes on presumed income, based on the
value of assets or gross sales. This would help to close
the funding gap and strengthen direct taxation, while
effectively implementing underlying reforms. In the
case of IRP, it would be advisable to move towards a
scheme of taxation based on global income, even
though the administration of the tax is considered more
complicated than that of the existing schedule-based
taxes.
4. Improve the income distribution
Additional efforts are also needed to substantially
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tax and
customs administration. Otherwise no tax reform will
be successful. A start should be made by swiftly
approving modern tax codes that clearly establish the
rights and obligations of the parties involved, thereby
affording certainty, objectivity and transparency to the
Treasury-taxpayer relationship.
Moreover, given the highly concentrated nature of
the subregion's economies and shortcomings in tax
administrations, criteria for tax differentiation need to
be established on the basis of the size and characteristics
of the taxpayers in question. Large- and small-scale
taxpayers should not be treated with the same criteria
and administrative rules. Rules for small-scale taxpayers
should be adapted in view of their large number and
small revenue impact. It would therefore be advisable
to design a simplified declaration and payment system
for microenterprises and small businesses,
encompassing VAT, income tax and, where appropriate,
social security contributions. This would facilitate
administration and reduce compliance costs and
informality.
The trend towards eliminating minor taxes, rates,
duties, contributions, and licence fees should also be
intensified, since these small levies generate little
revenue but require the mobilization of a large number
of people and paperwork that distract the Treasury from
its main objectives.
Lastly, mechanisms such as tax courts for appealing
against administrative decisions need to be strengthened.
This type of appeals process, separate from the
administrative apparatus, would facilitate the
implementation of expeditious systems, making it possible
to validate the tax liability assessed by the administration




Adjusted R2 = 0.555; Number of observations = 121.
(4)
Adjusted R2 = 0.138; Number of observations = 120.
The variables are defined as follows:
T/Y = Tax revenues as a proportion of GDP (Y)
YPC = GDP per capita
GINI = Gini coefficient of income distribution
G/Y = Total public expenditure as a proportion of GDP
GSAL/Y = Public expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP
GED/Y = Public expenditure on education as a proportion
of GDP
In all equations GDP per capita appears as highly significant in
explaining the behaviour of fiscal variables. The Gini coefficient
In the estimated model, the fiscal variables normalized on
GDP are adequately explained by GDP per capita and the income
distribution (Gini coefficient). Two hypotheses were
expounded in the text: tax revenue and public expenditure as
a proportion of GDP vary (i) directly with per capita income;
and (ii) inversely with inequality in the income distribution.
The results, calculated for the late 1990s using World Bank
(2004) data, can be summarized as follows:
(1)
Adjusted R2 = 0.469; Number of observations = 95. Figures
in parentheses correspond to the t-statistic; an asterisk
indicates that the coefficient in question is statistically
significant at the 5% confidence level, and two asterisks
indicate significance at the 1% level.
(2)
Adjusted R2 = 0.307; Number of observations = 120.
T/Y =  1.45 + 3.97log YPC – 0.36 GINI
(0.18) (5.20)** (–4.93)**
G/Y =  19.50 + 2.66log YPC – 0.36 GINI
(2.42)* (3.57)** (–4.42)**
GSAL / Y =  –4.36  +  1.10log YPC – 0.039 GINI
(–3.54)** (9.67)** (–3.19)**
GED/Y = 0.74 + 0.54 log YPC – 0.02 GINI
(0.44) (3.49)** (–1.12)
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is also significant in all equations except (4), which explains
the variations between countries in public expenditure on
education. Naturally this model is extremely parsimonious.
An attempt was also made to include a variable that would
measure natural resource wealth (exports of minerals as a
proportion of total exports), but this proved not to be significant.
The possible endogeneity of the Gini coefficient with respect to
GDP per capita (as suggested by Kuznets' inverted-U) does not
cause problems of multicollinearity that invalidate the results
obtained.
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